INTRODUCTION
It is generally believed that the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and 18th Constitutional Amendment have taken a major step towards much needed fiscal decentralisation. While these two delegate more fiscal autonomy and transfers additional resources towards provinces, it seems difficult that tax decentralisation options provided in these two can practically be implemented. This assertion is based on historical tax decentralisation debate in Pakistan, which has made it a very complex issue in management of public finances.
There are arguments both in favour and against tax decentralisation in Pakistan. Its proponents argue that tax decentralisation is an important principle of governance. They generally propose three advantages of fiscal decentralisation including; preferencematching, efficiency through competition, and increased accountability. In particular, a rational assignment of taxing powers helps providing each level of government, a control over its fiscal destiny by allowing it the choice in the level of spending. It helps assuring taxpayers that they are getting what they paid for and consequently may stimulate participation and improve/increase accountability. According to Bahl (1999) , fiscal decentralisation assists in revenue mobilisation, innovation in economic activity, accountability of elected officials and grassroots participation in governance. Given this, it is probable that fiscal decentralisation lead towards improved efficiency in the use of resources as the residents in the sub-national governments can decide about their desired mix of public services and revenues that best suits them.
On the other hand, its opponents counter argue that its implementation seems difficult due to various factors like provincial governments do not have capacity to collect taxes, and the bulk of the taxes in Pakistan are usually paid at the headquarters of the firm that may lead to an unfair allocation of revenues after decentralisation. At the same time, the tax administration in Pakistan desires to move from General Sales Tax (GST) to reformed GST in Value Added Tax (VAT) mode in order to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio. Implementation of this would make the tax decentralisation much more complicated as it is difficult to distinguish the sales tax revenues from goods and services as a good producing factory also consume many services including telecommunication. Furthermore, as highlighted by Ahmed (2010) the abject performance of FBR and "trust deficit" among provinces and with the federal government add more complications in the practicality of GST reforms.
Despite these contradictory arguments, attempts were made to analyse the scope of sales tax on services by provincial governments to enhance tax-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan. SPDC (1994) is a systematic attempt which provides a comprehensive framework for sales taxation of services by provincial governments. It analysed the constitutional domain for implementing sales tax on services as per 1973 constitution. It also looked at the incidence of indirect taxes on services and concluded that nominal incidence of federal and provincial taxes on services sector was 2.3 percent of their value added. It also laid down a criterion for provincial resource mobilisation through effective implementation of GST on services. The criterion gave higher weightage to under taxation, extent of incidence on richer households, case for integration with national VAT, level of compliance, ease of collection and so on. It also proposed specific taxation proposals for services sector including banking and insurance, wholesale and retail, telecommunication and others. Regardless of such attempts, in 2000, the provincial governments empowered federal government to implement GST services. Since then GST services is being collected by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).
At present, in Pakistan financial status of provincial governments largely hinges on federal transfers to the provinces constituted through NFC award rather than on a rational tax assignment. There is an overriding centralisation of revenue collection as over 90 percent of the revenues are collected at the federal level consequently leaving the provinces with very narrow tax bases. From the perspective of sustainable public service provision, the provincial governments require enough "own" revenues rather than heavily relying on federal transfers and grants. GST on services is an ideal option for decentralisation ensured by the 18th Constitutional Amendment and 7th NFC Award.
In this context, this paper is an attempt to analyse the devolution of GST services and vertical imbalance in Pakistan. It determines the scope of GST services in minimising vertical imbalances, if implemented practically. Since, GST services has been initiated in 2000-01, the paper cover the period 2000-01 to 2009-10.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 underlines the constitutional provision of revenue assignment; Section 3 presents the pattern of resource mobilisation in Pakistan; Section 4 reveals the extent of vertical imbalance in Pakistan; Section 5 analyses the devolution of GST services and its impact on vertical imbalance; Section 6 discusses the implementation challenges in collecting GST services; and Section 7 concludes the paper.
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT AS PER CONSTITUTION
In Pakistan, the constitution and certain statutes designate the revenue assignments between the federal and provincial governments. After the abolishment of concurrent lists in the 18th Amendment, the revenue source assigned to the federal and provincial governments is through an express provision in an article of the constitution or through classification in the federal lists of subjects. In the latter case if the revenue source is mentioned in the Federal List it belongs to the federation only. However, if a revenue source is not mentioned in the Federal List it then belongs to the provinces only.
Federal taxes under the Fourth Schedule, Article 70(4), of the Constitution of Pakistan are given Table 1 . It states that among the indirect taxes the federal government has a constitutional right to collect taxes only on the sales and purchases of goods (imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed) but not on sales of services. This provides autonomy to the provincial governments to levy sales tax on services. The revenue assignment of provincial governments according to the constitutional scheme is given in Table 2 . It is to be mentioned that property tax, capital gains, excise duty, sales tax on services, tax on professions, motor vehicle tax are shared revenues under the NFC clauses of the constitution. The base and rate are set by the federation. Thus, according to the constitution of Pakistan, federal government is empowered to levy GST only on the sales, purchase and consumption of goods; however GST on services exclusively falls under the domain of provincial governments.
It was for this very reason that provinces levied sales tax on services on 15th July 2000. Later on, in 2000-01, the provincial governments empowered the federal government to collect GST services on their behalf. Since then federal government has been collecting GST services by breaking it into two modes: GST CE mode and GST provincial. The latter has been transferred to provinces (after deducting the collection charges) on the basis of population rather than collection. CE mode was being treated similar to GST goods before the implementation of 7th NFC Award (July 2010).
Though, collection of sales tax on services already remains a constitutional right of provinces, the 7th NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment further strengthened this. The document of the 18th Amendment states, in fourth schedule of the constitution, in the federal legislative list, entry 49 after the word "consumed" the comma and words "except sales tax on services" shall be added. As a result, GST services CE mode is transferred to provincial governments.
RESOURCE MOBILISATION IN PAKISTAN
Before analysing the impact of tax decentralisation on provincial finances, this section presents the pattern of resource mobilisation (generating the required resources to carry out expenditures for public service delivery) in Pakistan by major revenue source both at the federal and provincial levels. Table 3 gives the magnitude and growth in different components of FBR tax revenue in Pakistan. In 2009-10, total tax revenue in Pakistan was Rs 1,380 billion. Of this, 39 percent were the direct taxes and 61 percent were indirect taxes. 16 percent of the indirect taxes were originated via excise duties and 20 percent via import duties while the remaining from GST on goods and services. The trend in growth indicates that tax revenue increased at an average rate of 11 percent per annum during 2001-05 and 18 percent during 2006-10; indicating higher growth in federal taxes in the second half on 2000s. In the first half of 2000s, highest growth was observed in GST services while in second half it was in direct taxes. During the entire period, GST services depicted highest growth that could be due to the fact that it started from a zero base. Table 4 presents the trend in tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan. It shows that total tax revenue remained on average 9.2 percent per annum of GDP during 2001-05 and increased slightly to 9.5 percent during 2006-10. Direct taxes that on average constituted 3 percent per annum of GDP during 2001-05 increased on average by 0.5 percentage points during 2006-10. Alternatively, indirect taxes declined from an average of 6.2 percent per annum of GDP to 5.9 percent of GDP during these two sub-periods. It is noticeable that contribution of GST on goods in GDP remained on average over 3 percent per annum during these sub-periods while that of GST on services stayed at less than 0.5 percent.
Resource Mobilisation at Federal Level
1 Table 4 Trend in Tax Relative to taxes, higher growth in non-tax revenues indicates that provincial revenues are tilted towards non-tax revenue. Further, over the entire period, provincial taxes grew at a pace similar to federal taxes suggesting that capacity of provincial governments in collecting taxes is not as bad as it usually argued.
Resource Mobilisation at Provincial Level

VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE IN PAKISTAN
Vertical fiscal imbalance means the disparity between the revenues of a government and its expenditure responsibilities. An adequate provision of social services is a concurrent function of federal and provincial governments. However, the combination of decentralised spending with centralised financing through grants and tax revenue sharing leads to vertical fiscal imbalance. This situation prevails in Pakistan where the financing and delivery of social services largely lie in the hands of provinces and major sources of revenues in the hand of federal government creating vertical imbalances. Table 6 shows the total tax and non-tax revenue collected by the federal and provincial governments. Noticeably, the table reveals that the federal government collects 92 percent to 94 percent of the revenue in Pakistan. Only 6 percent to 8 percent of the revenues are collected by the provincial governments. This suggests that provincial governments have a very narrow base of revenue collection. Source: GoP, Economic Survey (Various Issues). Table 7 gives only the total tax collection of federal and provincial governments. It further strengthens the point that provinces have limited control in collection of taxes in Pakistan. In most of the years since 2000-01, provincial governments collected only 4 percent of the total taxes in the country. On the other hand, the current expenditures of the federal and provincial government given in Table 8 indicate that the share of provinces in total current expenditure is far high. Provinces spend 23 percent to 29 percent of the total current expenditure in Pakistan. It needs to mention that the share of provinces would go up if these expenditures include the amount of development expenditures. Thus, while provincial share in tax revenue on average is less than 5 percent during the 2000s their share in expenditure is over 25 percent indicating the extent of vertical imbalance in Pakistan. This builds the argument that provinces to a large extent depend on the resources or transfers from the federal government to meet their expenditures demand. Accordingly, in Pakistan, 88 percent of the provincial government"s resources depend on intergovernmental transfers. In contrast, in other developing countries, like India and Malaysia, 35 percent of the provincial government"s resources come from intergovernmental transfers.
DEVOLUTION OF GST SERVICES AND VERTICAL IMBALANCE
Having developed that there are significant vertical imbalances in Pakistan, it is important to analyse whether or not devolution of GST services will make any sizeable impact. As Khan (2009) highlights that services sector constitutes more than half of the value added of the economy, but it is fetching only 34 percent of the federal tax receipts. While mentioning the difficulties in taxing services, he points out that many services are rendered at the distribution process or at the stage of production, which sometime have informal characteristics, hence making it difficult to collect taxes from them. Given the narrow base of services and difficulties attached to collecting taxes from them, this section first highlights the contribution of GST in overall FBR taxes and then looks whether GST services has sizeable tax base. As per scope of the study, it excludes other taxation on services sector such as Federal Excise Duty (FED), income tax and the like. It also compares effective tax rate of GST services with other taxes to highlight the tax potential in GST services. Afterwards, it compares the vertical imbalances in revenue transfer to the provincial governments with or without GST services. Table 9 gives the contribution of GST on services in comparison with GST on goods under different tax heads. For instance, in total GST, services contributed on average only 7.4 percent per annum during 2001-05, which increases to 12.6 percent during 2005-10. GST services contributed on average 4.5 percent per annum in total indirect taxes and 3 percent per annum in total tax revenue during 2001-05. These shares increased to 7.7 percent and 4.8 percent respectively during 2006-10. While in comparison with GST goods these shares are still very low, they showed relatively higher growth. Table 10 shows the ratios of GST goods and GST services base to GDP. While base-to-GDP ratio of GST goods substantially increased, base-to-GST ratio of services hovered around over 20 percent during the two sub-periods. This happened because FBR focused only on the efficiency of GST services collection till 2008-09, without broadening its tax base. However in 2009-10, new services like banking insurances and other were also added to broaden its base. Table 11 portrays the effective tax rate of different components of tax revenues in Pakistan. It indicates that effective tax rate of GST services hanged on average only about 1.4 percent and 2 percent per annum respectively during the two sub-periods. GST on goods though declined from an average of 12 percent per annum during 2001-05 to nearly 9 percent during 2006-10 but remained far above than that of GST on services. GST services have lowest rates because of lower efficiency of tax collection and tax exemptions. This lowest effective tax rate indicates greater potential of GST in services sector. Though, it is apparent there exist potential of taxation in the services sector but the idea here is to observe how far the vertical imbalance be reduced once the provinces are empowered to collect GST services. Table 12 displays the share of provincial tax revenues in total taxes with and without GST services. It indicates that had the GST services been devolved in 2000-01 and had it acquired the same efficiency then provincial share of taxes would have increased from 4.3 percent to 6.3 percent in 2000-01. And, with the passage of time this share would have further increased to 8.6 percent in 2009-10. Thus, with full provincial share of GST services, provincial share in taxes would have more than doubled during 2006-10. 
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Role of GST Services in Minimising Vertical Imbalances
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Despite the fact that devolving GST service has constitutional provision and it also reduces the vertical imbalances, this has not yet been put into practice. There are certain challenges that often come in its implementation debate. These can be sum-up in following three arguments.
 Provincial governments do not have the capacity to collect GST on services.  Under VAT regime, collection of goods and services cannot be separated.  Bulk of the taxes in Pakistan are paid at the headquarters of the firm that may lead to an unfair allocation of revenues after decentralisation.
This section systematically discusses the validity of these arguments by analysing the structure of GST services. Table 14 presents the GST collected on services by sectors in 2009-10. The statistics reveal that GST on services is largely collected from telecommunication sector, which contributed more than 70 percent of total GST on services. Historically, the share of telecommunication in GST services was more than 90 percent. The other major tax spinners are banking and insurance (tax collected under federal excise duty), community and social services, and transport and communication services. 
Devolution of GST on Telecommunications
There are several apprehensions regarding the devolution of GST on telecommunication services. For example, does it require lots of capacity that provincial government do not have at present? Will it lead to an unfair allocation among provinces? Is it impossible under VAT regime?
As per our understanding, the answer to all these questions is in negative. Firstly, there are fewer telecommunication companies to deal with. They have computerised record and have complete information about usage of their services, charging of bills and payment of taxes. As a result, devolution of telecommunication taxes does not require much capacity and provincial governments can easily collect tax with these fewer computerised telecommunication companies. Their computerised records also help minimising the scope of unfair allocation among the provinces. However, devolution of GST on telecommunication under VAT mode is relatively a difficult task. Attempts have been made at the federal and provincial (Sindh) government level to resolve this issue. Their technical teams concluded, "while VAT regime requires "input-output adjustment" to be centralised, collection can be decentralised." For instance, as per 2009-10 estimate provinces can collect Rs 45 billion in GST from telecommunications services. Since bulk of this tax is collected from end users with limited scope for input output adjustment, however, companies seeking refunds submit consolidated (goods and services) account/claim to FBR. As per FBR estimates these refunds hardly reached to Rs 3.5 billion. After receiving and verifying these refund claims FBR can provide refunds (Rs 3.5 billion) to companies and provinces can reimburse FBR the amount equivalent to refund claims i.e. Rs 3.5 billion.
Devolution of GST on Banking and Insurance
Banking and insurance sector is the second biggest contributor in services tax. At present, the services of this sector are taxed under FED mode and not under GST. Nevertheless, after the 7th NFC Award, it is likely that this collection can be treated as GST. This sector also has smaller number of banking and insurance companies, mostly in formal sector, having computerised records. Given this, the provincial governments do not require much capacity and can easily deal with them. Moreover, complete computerised transaction details also minimise the scope of unfair allocations of GST among the provinces. Similar to telecommunication sector, the input output adjustment can be dealt by federal government; however, the collection can be devolved.
Devolution of GST on Other Sectors
In contrast to telecommunication and banking and insurance, other sectors have large number of tax payers. The provincial governments need to build capacity in order to collect GST from them. In this regard, recently an attempt has been made by the government of Sindh where it established a board named Sindh Revenue Services (SRS). It has an independent board of directors and separate collection mechanism. Currently, the progress of SRS working is slow as the decision to devolved GST services is in pending.
Certain confusions also prevail regarding the collection of GST services. For example, there is confusion that if more than one person was involved in consuming a service like telecommunication then who will pay the tax. And if they live in different provinces then which province would receive the revenue from GST services. Theoretically, this argument seems very difficult but in reality this can be addressed very easily. For example, every telecommunication company charges a fee on its services. While two persons are consuming same service the bill is generally paid by one person. Since GST service is a proportional tax on billing amount, it would be collected by the province whose consumer bears the charges of bill and hence that province will receive the revenue. The same logic can be followed if more than one consumer pays the billing amount and taxes, whether in a pre-or post-paid manner.
Another confusion is whether or nor GST service is a part of divisible pool. Prior to the 7th NFC Award, GST on services CE mode was part of the divisible pool and GST provincial tax was treated as straight transfers. After the 7th NFC Award, both GST provincial and CE mode would be treated as straight transfers and hence GST services would no more be part of divisible pool.
CONCLUSION
In Pakistan, confinement of major sources of revenues with the federal government and a sizeable expenditures assignment at provincial level creates vertical fiscal imbalances. While these vertical imbalances are generally addressees through intergovernmental transfers, there is still a need to devolve taxes at provincial levels. The 7th NFC Award and 18th Constitutional Amendment ensure that a GST services is a provincial tax. In this context, this paper analyses the scope of GST services in minimising the vertical fiscal imbalances in Pakistan. The analysis indicates that devolution of GST services will help doubling the share of provincial tax revenues in total taxes thus facilitate reducing vertical imbalances in Pakistan. Moreover, the telecommunication sector, which pays bulk of the GST services, requires limited provincial capacities for collection of GST as there are fewer telecommunication companies in Pakistan and all have computerised database.
Though, the devolution of GST services will reduce the vertical imbalance but it will not eliminate it completely. Future NFCs would therefore be needed to address the issues of reaming vertical and horizontal imbalances.
